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1Reducing Unlawful Prescription Drug Promotion: 
Is the Public Health Being Served by an Enforcement Approach  
that Focuses on Punishment?
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the imposition of increasingly substantial fines1 and recently successful efforts to impose 
individual liability on corporate executives under the Park doctrine,2 punishing pharmaceutical 
companies and their executives for unlawful promotional activities has not been as successful in 
achieving compliance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) as the protection 
of the public health demands. Over the past decade, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have shifted their focus from correction and compliance to a 
more punitive model when it comes to allegedly unlawful promotion of pharmaceuticals. The shift 
initially focused on imposing monetary penalties and was arguably justified by the expectation 
that financial punishment would achieve a level of compliance that would reduce the need for 
correction. By exacting enormous fines from companies, the agencies presumably hoped that the 
costs associated with unlawful promotion would be too high to justify the monetary benefits of 
non-compliance. Unfortunately, however, that approach has not been entirely successful. Despite 
the growth in settlements and penalties, and the recent efforts to hold individual executives 
liable for corporate misbehavior, the intended impact of substantially increased compliance has 
only partially materialized. The upward spiraling of settlement amounts and the trend toward 
prosecuting repeat offenders indicate that a change in approach is necessary.  
This article argues that FDA and DOJ cannot justify a continued emphasis on punishment without 
more demonstrable improvement in compliance and corporate accountability. The article goes 
on to describe several proposals to refocus the agencies’ efforts to effectively address the impact 
of unlawful promotion on public health by returning to an approach that emphasizes the more 
traditional goals of correction and compliance. It also argues that any meaningful protection of 
the public health ultimately requires a broader public understanding of the issues surrounding 
unlawful promotion of pharmaceutical products and greater participation by patients; physicians; 
health care professionals; and others with an interest in, and the opportunity to, impact this area. 
Increasing the public’s ability and interest in monitoring companies’ promotional activities at every 
level will reinforce the benefits of compliance, which will better serve the public health goals of the 
FD&C Act. 
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2POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•	 FDA should partner with companies to efficiently and effectively clarify the 
rules regarding off-label promotion and address their First Amendment 
concerns in a comprehensive fashion through informal rulemaking or 
substantive guidance.
•	 FDA should receive a portion of the fines recovered from settlements 
associated with unlawful drug promotion to improve and increase the 
agency’s oversight of companies’ promotion and advertising activities 
through its traditional correction and compliance approach. 
•	 FDA and other entities should continue efforts to educate health care 
professionals, patients, and the public about lawful methods of promotion 
and advertising so these groups can play an active role in reducing 
companies’ incentives to over-promote their products.
II. BACKGROUND
The FD&C Act limits drugs sold in the United States to those that are proven to be “safe and effective 
for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.”3 When FDA 
approves an application for a new drug, it identifies the specific uses for which the drug may be 
marketed.4 Thus, promoting an approved drug for an unapproved use (i.e., for an “off-label” use) 
renders the drug “new” under the FD&C Act. Whether the expanded claims for use are truthful 
representations about a prescription drug is irrelevant, as such claims must still be approved by 
FDA before the manufacturer can promote them.5 
Although manufacturers are generally prohibited from promoting off-label uses of their approved 
drugs, discussion about off-label uses among non-company parties is critical to the public health. 
More than half of all uses of drugs and biologics in cancer care in the United States are off-label.6 
The percentage of off-label uses is even higher for products used to treat pediatric patients.7 
Thus, FDA does not regulate the exchange of information about off-label uses between scientists, 
physicians, consumers, and other entities or individuals unrelated to the company to exchange and 
disseminate information about off-label uses.8 And because off-label information is so critical to 
the public health, even for companies and others who are responsible for marketing an approved 
drug, FDA has carved out some limited exceptions to the prohibition on off-label communications.9 
Those exceptions reflect FDA’s efforts to balance the value of exchanging off-label information 
against the risk of unlawful promotion; they carefully circumscribe the conditions under which the 
information is delivered to ensure that it is scientifically valid and not presented in a promotional 
manner.10
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Until fairly recently, FDA bore almost sole responsibility for preventing unlawful promotion of 
prescription drugs through its application and enforcement of administrative, civil, and criminal 
penalties under the FD&C Act. As a general principle, FDA’s practice has been to avoid punitive 
sanctions11 and focus its efforts on correction and compliance.12 In practice, FDA’s approach resulted 
in the agency addressing claims on an individual basis, focusing on specific pieces of labeling, 
advertisements, or activities, rather than considering the overall context and collective impact of 
claims made as part of companies’ broader marketing schemes.13 
More recently, however, FDA’s correction and compliance approach has been overshadowed by 
the DOJ’s efforts to punish unlawful promotion by using enforcement tools traditionally applied 
in healthcare anti-fraud actions. For just over a decade now, DOJ has been pursuing a more 
aggressive application of the new drug and criminal misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act and 
has expanded its efforts to punish unlawful promotion through the False Claims Act.14 Under the 
False Claims Act, companies that unlawfully promote approved products are treated by DOJ as the 
“but for” cause of physicians’ decisions to prescribe those drugs and thus for the submission of a 
“false claim” (i.e., requesting federal health care program reimbursement for an uncovered off-label 
use) to the government.15 
Despite the financial toll that DOJ has been able to exact from companies that engage in unlawful 
promotional activities, some of the companies that have previously settled with the government for 
significant amounts have come under repeated scrutiny for unlawful promotion violations.16 Even 
if the focus of these subsequent enforcement actions is on behavior from a number of years ago, it 
does not change the perception (and in some cases the reality) that large monetary penalties alone 
are not achieving the anticipated levels of compliance. Indeed, Congress has expressed concerns 
about the limits of financial punishment and has questioned FDA and DOJ regarding the lack of 
enforcement actions aimed at individuals. In response, FDA and DOJ have indicated their intent 
to expand enforcement efforts against unlawful promotion to include more individual company 
executives17 primarily through a revival of the responsible corporate officer doctrine (also known as 
the Park doctrine).18 
Under the Park doctrine, the government can seek a misdemeanor conviction against a company 
official for violating a provision of the FD&C Act that impacts the public health (even if the official 
was unaware of the violation) if the official was in a position of authority to correct or prevent 
the violation and failed to do so.19 A collateral consequence of such liability includes potential 
exclusion from participation in any federal health care programs under the Social Security Act,20 
which essentially deprives an individual of the opportunity to work in the health care industry 
for a prescribed period of time. Although financial penalties alone have not curtailed unlawful 
promotional practices, the principle under Park that a person may be convicted of a criminal 
offense even in the absence of “the conventional requirement for criminal conduct— awareness 
of some wrongdoing”21 has been questioned on due process and fundamental fairness grounds.22 
Just a few months ago, however, the government’s authority to impose Park liability was affirmed 
by the United State Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia when it upheld application of the 
exclusionary sanction imposed on several executives of the Purdue-Frederick Company.23 Based on 
the executives’ agreement to plead guilty to misdemeanor liability under Park, they were barred 
4under the Social Security Act from doing business with the federal government for 12 years.24 
Although the court remanded the case on the issue of the appropriate length of the debarment, it 
upheld the application of the sanction under Park. 
There is no question that for many of the stakeholders interested in this issue, the threat of 
punishment to curtail promotional activities feels broken. In part, that is because the enforcement 
approach selected to address promotional activity implicates companies’ First Amendment rights. 
Once DOJ initiates a fraud prosecution, the “unlawful” promotion that comes under review includes 
not only the obvious false and misleading activities of a company but also activity that arguably falls 
under legitimate off-label promotion and into the gray area of truthful and scientific information. 
Given the important role that off-label information can play in making well-informed and effective 
health care choices, relying primarily on a broad punishment model that diminishes the focus on 
the delicate balance between lawful and unlawful off-label and other types of promotion will not 
be the best public health choice in many cases. Moreover, to the extent punishment under DOJ’s 
current enforcement approach moves slowly, the potential for risk to the public health increases. 
Reinvigorating FDA’s traditional approach of encouraging correction and compliance provides a 
more effective choice for achieving the goals under the FDA&C Act of promoting and protecting 
the public health. 
III. MAJOR ISSUES IN DISPUTE
A. The current approach to punishing unlawful promotion fails to address 
pharmaceutical companies’ First Amendment rights or to provide sufficient notice to 
companies about the boundaries for acceptable promotional speech.
Companies that intentionally engage in promotion that is false, lacking in fair balance (i.e., between 
the drug’s risks and benefits), or otherwise misleading25 are properly punishable under the FD&C 
Act. Promotion and protection of the public health demands that we not tolerate false or misleading 
promotional claims, whether about on-label or off-label uses. Failure to curtail such unlawful 
promotion undercuts FDA’s mandate to ensure that approved drugs are safe and effective for their 
intended uses and exposes patients to unnecessary and dangerous risks. 
Where, however, promotion about an off-label or any other use or claim about an approved product 
is not false, misleading, or otherwise unlawful on its face, a policy that prevents the manufacturer 
of the product from communicating information about its use implicates free speech concerns 
under the First Amendment.26 Companies have long bemoaned the lack of specific guidelines 
for resolving this tension between FDA regulations prohibiting the promotion of off-label uses, 
and their First Amendment rights to disseminate truthful scientific information about beneficial 
use of their products. Thus, while not a new issue, the uncertainty that still exists regarding the 
application of the First Amendment to speech about approved products is an important part of any 
conversation about the appropriate enforcement approach. 
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to the DOJ’s focus on punishment has significantly increased a company’s risk that promotional 
activity will be deemed unlawful. As a result, companies are even more aware of the delicate 
balance they must strike between acceptable off-label promotion and that which may attract 
the government’s attention. However, even for companies that are highly motivated to comply 
with promotional boundaries, it is not always possible to predict when FDA or DOJ will decide 
that communications about scientific and truthful information cross the First Amendment line 
and become “unlawful promotion.” The dire consequences of this lack of guidance are evident 
in multiple examples over the past few years of companies’ more aggressive attempts to seek 
guidance in this area. These efforts include individual law suits filed against FDA claiming that the 
agency’s prohibition of off-label communications denies a company its First Amendment right to 
provide truthful information about lawfully marketed products.27 Other companies have joined 
forces to request greater clarity on when promotional speech by a manufacturer is considered 
unlawful. In July of 2011, for example, seven companies filed a Citizen Petition requesting that FDA 
clarify its policies and regulations on off-label promotion of approved products.28 In August 2011, 
the Medical Information Working Group (comprised of eleven major manufacturers of prescription 
drugs and medical devices) submitted an amicus brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit detailing the lack of clarity under current FDA regulations regarding permissible and 
impermissible speech and arguing that FDA restrictions in this area be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny. 29
Although even the most detailed guidance cannot guarantee one hundred percent compliance, 
clearer rules would represent a substantial step forward in this area. The vast majority of companies 
with rigorous regulatory affairs professionals and marketing departments strive to promote 
products within the confines of the law; a better sense of where the First Amendment line falls 
would be a substantial step toward more comprehensive compliance, which in turn would benefit 
the public health.
B. FDA’s traditional approach to unlawful promotion, which focuses on correction and 
compliance, is critical to achieving the FD&C Act goals of protecting and promoting 
the public health and should not be subsumed by enforcement efforts that focus on 
punishment. 
Unlawful promotion that entails false and misleading information in any form is a serious violation 
of the public trust and welfare. Where, however, unlawful promotion arguably includes speech 
protected under the First Amendment, FDA should avoid controlling that speech in a manner that 
unnecessarily undermines the public health goals of the FD&C Act. Indeed, the truthful exchange 
of scientific information should be encouraged.
Enforcement efforts by DOJ and FDA over the past decade have relied primarily on the imposition 
of large financial penalties and punishment of company executives to deter future misconduct. 
Such efforts lack several important advantages of FDA’s more traditional correction and compliance 
approach, including: (1) fostering collaboration between FDA and companies, (2) leveraging FDA’s 
expertise, and (3) achieving more immediate and forward- looking results. To the extent enforcement 
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FDA’s traditional approach is necessary to achieve the goals of the FD&C Act. 
FDA’s traditional approach to unlawful promotion fosters collaboration and communication with 
regulated companies. When FDA acts as the primary gate keeper, it makes a preliminary assessment 
as to the lawfulness of certain promotional material. Typically, FDA initiates action with a regulatory 
compliance (untitled or warning) letter. The letter states FDA’s objection to specific claims being 
made in the promotional labeling or advertising and provides an opportunity for the company 
to discuss appropriate marketing messages with FDA. In most cases, companies comply with the 
agency’s recommendations and reach some mutually-agreeable resolution with FDA.30 Only if the 
parties are unable to agree is more formal action sought through FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel or 
DOJ’s Office of Consumer Litigation. 
This traditional approach also effectively leverages the agency’s expertise. As the gatekeeper, FDA 
does more than decide what companies can say about their products; it also considers important 
public health interests and First Amendment concerns. FDA has long recognized that balancing 
these competing interests is critical to preserving the important benefits associated with the free 
exchange of scientific information on which many health care providers and patients rely.31 
Consistent with its congressionally-mandated mission to promote and protect the public health, 
when FDA considers the substantive content and impact of promotional labeling and advertising, 
its primary goal is to ensure that information is not false or misleading. In contrast, under DOJ’s 
False Claims Act theory, even truthful off-label marketing may give rise to a “false” claim.32 Thus, 
unlike FDA’s traditional correction and compliance approach, the DOJ’s use of health care fraud 
enforcement tools to challenge and punish unlawful promotional activity does not leverage 
regulatory expertise in the same way.33 
Finally, when its efforts are focused on correction and compliance, FDA can effect change in a 
timely and productive manner. Although DOJ may obtain correction and compliance measures in 
a negotiated settlement,34 it can take years of investigation and negotiation with companies before 
such measures are in place. In contrast, FDA’s traditional approach has the advantage of providing 
timelier challenges to, and resolutions of, companies’ promotional activities. 
Overall, the shift from compliance to punishment has come at the cost of collaboration, subtlety, 
flexibility, and speed in assessing the impact of individual company communications. The cost 
is greatest regarding the dissemination of information that is arguably protected under the First 
Amendment. Thus, even if the current trend of punishing unlawful promotion beyond FDA’s 
available administrative remedies is effective, FDA’s traditional method better promotes and 
protects the public health and deserves continued support. 
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primary consumers of product information were better informed about how to 
evaluate it and could assume a more active role in monitoring and maintaining the 
quality of such information. 
There is a continuing perception that DOJ’s approach—now more than a decade old—has 
simply been accepted by industry as part of the “cost of doing business.”35 Although punishment 
for unlawful promotion has forced some companies to fundamentally restructure the sale and 
marketing of their products to discourage future violations,36 reports of ongoing investigations 
and companies with subsequent settlement agreements continue. Additionally, DOJ’s increased 
attention on unlawful promotion in the medical device area37 also suggests that continued concern 
about the impact of unlawful promotion on the public health is justified. Thus, recent indicators of 
company compliance support the assertion that to some extent, and despite enormous financial 
settlements, such activity is still profitable enough to justify the risk of legal action.38 
It may be that increasing the responsibility of corporate executives and Boards of Directors, through 
the use of the Park doctrine or otherwise, will eventually effectuate a change in corporate culture 
that will improve compliance. Even then, however, there are simply too many avenues and too 
many individuals involved in the sale and marketing of products to ensure total compliance. Indeed, 
the decision to allow direct-to-consumer advertising, which has increased dramatically since the 
late 1990s,39 has resulted in pharmaceuticals and other health care products becoming the subject 
of mass marketing campaigns that span virtually every type of media outlet. If the proliferation 
of information was intended to result in better educated and savvier consumers of health care 
information, the reality is the opposite. Even physicians find it difficult to absorb all the relevant 
details about products.40 
If direct-to-consumer and the myriad of other promotional avenues are going to remain open 
to companies, then all consumers of such information should be better educated about how to 
evaluate and monitor promotional materials that may exaggerate the safety and effectiveness 
of products. Even more critical for the public health, some mechanism for reporting and sharing 
information about unlawful promotional activities should exist. 
IV. RESEARCH AND RESPONSE
These specific recommendations relate to the problem areas identified in Part III. 
A. FDA should partner with companies to efficiently and effectively clarify the rules 
regarding off-label promotion and address their First Amendment concerns in a 
comprehensive fashion through informal rulemaking or substantive guidance.  
Despite years of effort, pharmaceutical companies have been unable to obtain appropriate 
guidance or clear answers from FDA regarding the line between truthful dissemination of scientific 
information and unlawful off-label promotion. As the consequences of unlawful promotion increase, 
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exercise of companies’ First Amendment rights. FDA needs to accept its responsibility to establish 
clear guidelines and respond in a timely and comprehensive manner to that reasonable demand. 
If FDA fails to act, the agency and companies will be left with the far less attractive alternative 
of continued reliance on individual cases to “incrementally address[ing] discrete aspects of the 
government’s off-label promotional policy.”41 Operating under that piecemeal approach serves 
only to reinforce companies’ perceptions that they are subject to arbitrary decisions regarding the 
bounds of unlawful promotion, which make prediction, and thus compliance, impossible. Without 
creating a more compliance-focused approach, the negative consequences of unlawful promotion 
to physicians and patients will continue. In turn, the lack of clarity regarding compliance stifles 
companies’ ability to disseminate lawfully scientific and truthful information relevant to important 
and developing health care concerns.  
Expertise and experience make FDA especially well–equipped to shoulder the responsibility of 
generating promotional guidelines consistent with companies’ First Amendment rights. The actual 
form of such guidelines is not as critical as the need to compile and articulate a comprehensive set 
of rules for companies to follow. Informal rulemaking or guidance documents could be as helpful as 
formal rulemaking. FDA’s recent draft guidance to industry on responding to unsolicited requests 
for off-label uses42 is just one example of the agency’s ability to provide clear distinctions between 
the dissemination of truthful and scientific information and unlawful promotional behavior. Among 
the more helpful features of this form of guidance are examples of common factual scenarios that 
arise in the ordinary course of business that specifically address the types of questions companies 
struggle with in their efforts to market lawfully. 
Indications are that FDA is motivated to develop more of these types of documents in response to 
industry demands for clarification. The agency’s recent request for information and comments on 
“Communication and Activities Related to Off-Label Uses of Marketed Products and Use of Products 
Not Yet Legally Marketed,”43 generated partly in response to the Citizen Petition,44 exemplifies a 
natural vehicle for FDA to efficiently and effectively establish the types of detailed guidelines 
needed for specific types of communications. The challenge then is to push FDA to produce such 
documents in a timely manner. 
FDA might also consider the United Kingdom’s “Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry.”45 
The broad spectrum of claims and activities covered by the Code supports the argument that it is 
indeed possible to establish clear guidelines about dissemination of truthful information. Moreover, 
the Code’s inclusion of detailed supplementary information for each of its rules effectively addresses 
specific circumstances in a manner that encourages companies to focus on compliance. Such an 
approach is consistent with the Code’s repeated emphasis on the promotion of the public health, 
which applies equally to the goals of the FD&C Act. “The Code recognizes and seeks to achieve 
a balance between the needs of patients, health professionals and the public, bearing in mind 
the political and social environment within which the industry operates and the statutory controls 
governing medicines.”46 
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guidelines is not an impossible task and no basis for further delay is justified. To the extent companies 
continue to pressure FDA to produce guidance documents across those areas that implicate First 
Amendment rights, the goals of compliance and promotion and protection of the public health 
will be well-served. 
B. FDA should receive a portion of the fines recovered from settlements associated 
with unlawful drug promotion to improve and increase the agency’s oversight of 
companies’ promotion and advertising activities through its traditional correction 
and compliance approach. 
FDA’s traditional approach of correction and compliance allows the agency to proceed thoughtfully 
about individual communications and circumstances, but this approach is labor intensive. Striving 
to ensure that promotional labeling and advertising information is not false, lacking in fair balance 
(i.e., as between the drug’s risks and benefits), or otherwise misleading demands medical, scientific, 
practical, and regulatory expertise, which is expensive. To satisfy the FD&C Act goals of promoting 
and protecting the public health, FDA requires substantially more resources to address and monitor 
companies’ promotional activities, which play an important role in the delivery of healthcare 
information. 
As described above, continuing timely collaboration between FDA and companies and leveraging 
FDA’s expertise in this area are critical to fostering an environment of correction and compliance 
that will best serve the public health goals of the FD&C Act. Although suggesting an increase in 
funding of any agency may be politically unpopular, it seems less likely to be true in the case of FDA, 
which is traditionally recognized as being dangerously underfunded.47 Additionally, there is a large 
source of funding to which FDA arguably has a special claim: fines recovered from companies for 
health care violations under the FD&C Act and the False Claims Act. 
Currently, the large financial settlements related to unlawful promotion and recovered from 
pharmaceutical companies are deposited directly into the general government coffers. Thus, 
even while FDA testifies before Congress about the need to reauthorize the Prescription Drug and 
Medical Device User Fee Acts, at a cost of hundreds of millions,48 companies that are directly subject 
to FDA oversight contribute billions of dollars in negotiated settlements to the federal government. 
Dedicating even a small fraction of those settlement amounts to increasing FDA oversight and 
compliance efforts would enhance the agency’s ability to address questions and concerns about 
off-label and other promotional activities. Use of recovered monies for those purposes would more 
appropriately further the goals of protecting and promoting the public health. 
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C. FDA and other entities should continue efforts to educate health care professionals, 
patients, and the public about lawful methods of promotion and advertising so these 
groups can play an active role in reducing companies’ incentives to over-promote 
their products.
The escalation of monetary settlements and the more recent focus on holding individuals liable for 
unlawful promotional activity are indicative of the government’s efforts to increase accountability 
and change the way companies operate. In theory, there is some point at which the potential costs 
of unlawful promotion, whether financial or more intangibly related to a diminution in goodwill or 
public reputation, will be significant enough to spear a fundamental change in the way companies 
are willing to promote their products. Until then, however, it is important to consider other methods 
by which FDA can assure that the public health is being promoted and protected consistent with 
the goals of the FD&C Act.  
Presumably, companies engage in unlawful promotion because the attendant benefits (i.e., profits) 
outweigh the potential risks and associated costs of such behavior. If promoting and protecting 
the public health are not sufficient company motivators, then efforts to pressure companies to 
align their behavior with the goals of the FD&C Act are necessary. If punishment, correction, and 
compliance efforts are not bringing about internal changes in company behavior, then pressure 
from external sources may be the answer. Several initiatives that focus on the receivers of information 
could contribute to changes in corporate behavior.
First, FDA’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP) in the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) should continue to promote and expand its “Bad Ad” Program.49 Launched in 
2010, the campaign is an “educational outreach program designed to educate healthcare providers 
about the role they can play in helping the agency make sure that prescription drug advertising 
and promotion is truthful and not misleading.” The program is administered by the agency’s OPDP 
in CDER, and has among its goals helping healthcare providers recognize misleading prescription 
drug promotion and providing them with an easy way to report such activity.50 FDA’s simple 
“Recognize and Report” approach to deter drug promoters from engaging in unlawful promotion 
is being used to create a culture of awareness among health care providers, starting at the very 
beginning of their careers and including medical students.51 If provided with additional resources 
as suggested above, FDA could expand its Bad Ad Program beyond health care providers to include 
patients and the public generally. By providing a greater proportion of people exposed to drug 
information with the tools to participate in monitoring, promotion would increase the compliance 
pressure on companies to the benefit of the public health. 
Second, in conjunction with FDA efforts to foster an environment that would engage consumers 
of health care information at all levels to encourage good promotional practices, Congress should 
continue to solicit input from interested parties about the best means of improving corporate 
integrity and combatting fraud. Recently, members of the Senate Committee on Finance, which has 
jurisdiction over Medicare and Medicaid programs, issued an open letter inviting “providers, payers, 
health plans, contractors, non-profit entities, consumers, data analytics entities, governmental 
partners, and patients” to submit solutions and suggestions for preventing and combatting 
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waste, fraud, and abuse in these programs. 52 Responses to this request may provide suggestions 
for expanding FDA’s Bad Ad Program to increase the amount of public participation and further 
enhance the sense that society will not tolerate corporate behavior that puts the public health at 
risk. 
Another measure available to increase external pressure on companies to curtail unlawful 
promotion is more widespread use of counter-detailing (sometimes referred to as “academic-
detailing”) programs, which are designed to provide health care providers with non-commercial 
educational information about products.53 Knowing that their promotional claims are likely to be 
challenged and scrutinized by professionals outside the company could decrease the incentive 
for companies and their individual sales representatives to risk credibility by disseminating false or 
misleading information. Similarly, increasing the oversight role of professional associations of which 
companies are members might also add to the external pressure to curtail unlawful promotion. 
And to the extent groups like Public Citizen and the World Health Organization can influence the 
culture within which companies operate, their impact on compliance may be profound.54 Overall, 
increasing awareness of promotional practices, encouraging broader participation of the public 
and society in general to serve as watch dogs, and fostering an environment where companies will 
suffer financial and other negative consequences if they are perceived as “poor corporate citizens,” 
may very well be the ultimate tool for achieving compliance and promoting and protecting the 
public health.
V. IMPACT OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The suggested recommendations are aimed at reducing the amount of unlawful promotion that 
compromises the public health and the integrity of our healthcare system. When drug promotion 
is false or misleading, or when off-label promotion extends beyond the boundaries of truthful 
scientific exchange of information, safety and effectiveness are compromised and patients are at 
risk. DOJ settlement announcements over the past decade consistently refer to companies that 
“put profits over patient safety” to justify the punishments imposed.55 If promotional activity is 
continuing to compromise the public health at the alarming rate suggested by the number and 
frequency of DOJ enforcement actions, then the imperative of ensuring patient safety demands 
that more successful compliance measures are necessary. The recommendations suggested here 
will further that important public health goal.
First, establishing clear guidelines about promotion that are consistent with the dissemination of 
truthful scientific information and that comport with the First Amendment are a crucial step toward 
improved compliance. By addressing companies’ complaints about uncertainty and providing the 
specific rules necessary to design an effective compliance program, FDA can improve companies’ 
abilities to conform their behavior to the public health goals of the FD&C Act. Second, shifting 
attention away from the primarily punitive enforcement efforts of the past decade and providing 
FDA with additional funding to expand and pursue its traditional oversight role will also better 
serve the public health by ensuring more timely correction and compliance and the corresponding 
decrease in risks to patient safety. Finally, by educating and empowering health care professionals, 
patients, and the public to play an active role in monitoring and reporting companies’ promotional 
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activities, FDA and other interested groups can exert external pressure on companies that will 
discourage them from engaging in actions that place the public health at risk. If punishment is 
not achieving those goals, then efforts such as those recommended here may better protect and 
promote the public health as required under the FD&C Act. 
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